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Abstract
We consider incentive compatible mechanisms for a domain that is very close to the
domain of scheduling n unrelated machines: the single exception is that the valuation of just
one machine is submodular. For the scheduling problem with such cost functions, we give
a lower bound of Ω(
√
n) on the approximation ratio of incentive compatible deterministic
mechanisms. This is a strong information-theoretic impossibility result on the approximation
ratio of mechanisms that provides strong evidence for the Nisan-Ronen conjecture. This is
the first non-constant lower bound that assumes no restriction on the mechanism side; in
contrast, all previous general results hold for only special classes of mechanisms such as
local, strongly monotone, and anonymous mechanisms. Our approach is based on a novel
multi-player characterization of appropriately selected instances that allows us to focus on
particular type of algorithms, linear mechanisms, and it is a potential stepping stone towards
the full resolution of the conjecture.
1 Introduction
The design of protocols that provide appropriate incentives to participants, entice them to
cooperate, and behave in a way which is socially beneficial has a long and celebrated history.
It is the realm of mechanism design which is one of the most researched branches of Game
Theory and Microeconomics. It studies the design of algorithms, called mechanisms, and it has
numerous applications to many situations in modern societies, whenever a protocol of conduct
of selfish participants is required. The mechanism asks each participant to bid their preferences
over the different social outcomes, and implements one of them (e.g. the one which is most
socially beneficial). The challenge is that the preferences of the participants are private, and they
are either unmotivated to report correctly, or strongly motivated to report them erroneously, if
a false report is profitable. A truthful mechanism provides incentives in a way that it is in the
best interest of each participant to bid truthfully.
The algorithmic nature of mechanism design and the associated computational issues, were
brought to light in the seminal 20-year-old paper by Nisan and Ronen [33], which essentially
established the area of algorithmic mechanism design. They proposed the scheduling problem
on unrelated machines, a fundamental, extensively studied from the algorithmic perspective,
optimization problem as a representative specimen to study the limitations of truthful mech-
anisms. The objective is to incentivize n machines to execute m tasks, so that the maximum
completion time of the machines, i.e. the makespan, is minimized. Traditional algorithms, such
as the best-known approximation algorithm [27], are not incentive compatible.
Nisan and Ronen applied the famous Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [36, 14,
23] which is a general machinery that truthfully computes the outcome that maximizes the
social welfare, which for the case of scheduling is the allocation that minimizes the sum of
completion times. The VCG is truthful and polynomial-time for scheduling, but with respect
to the makespan minimization it has a rather poor approximation ratio, equal to the number
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of machines n. Despite this, they conjectured that the VCG is the mechanism with the best
approximation ratio for this problem.
Conjecture 1. There is no deterministic truthful mechanism with approximation ratio better
than n for the problem of scheduling n unrelated machines.
The bound in the conjecture is information-theoretic, in the sense that it should hold for all
mechanisms (algorithms), polynomial-time or not. The Nisan-Ronen conjecture has developed
into one of the central problems in Algorithmic Game Theory, and despite intensive efforts, very
sparse progress has been made towards its resolution. The original Nisan-Ronen paper showed
that no truthful deterministic mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than 2.
This was improved to 2.41 [12], and later to 2.61 [24], which leaves a huge gap with the known
upper bound of n. The most general and interesting result, by Ashlagi et al.[3], resolved a
restricted version of the conjecture, for the special yet natural class of anonymous mechanisms.
However, the original conjecture (for non-anonymous mechanisms) is widely open.
The original conjecture was posed for the case of additive valuations, where the total cost
of each machine equals the sum of its individual costs of each task. However, most mechanism
design settings consider more general valuations such as submodular, subadditive etc. In these
valuations, the cost of a machine that takes a set of tasks S is a function of S that satisfies
some natural properties. For example, for subadditive valuations the cost of a bundle of tasks
S can be any value bounded above by the sum of the costs of the individual tasks in S.
It is natural to pose the Nisan-Ronen question for these extended valuation classes. Despite
the importance of the problem, the conjecture has been widely open for all such valuations.
The VCG mechanism provides a trivial n-approximation for these classes of valuations, while
the best known lower bounds are still the aforementioned constants. In this work, we focus
on submodular cost functions, where the marginal contribution of a task to the total cost of a
machine is a non-increasing function. The class of submodular valuations contains all additive
valuations, it is a proper subset of subadditive valuations, and it is one of the most restric-
tive natural class of valuations for the scheduling question. In the corresponding maximization
problem of combinatorial auctions, submodular valuations is the most-studied class in algorith-
mic mechanism design (see for example [26, 20, 17]). Our results hold also for supermodular
valuations.
1.1 Our result
We give the first non-constant lower bound that works for all deterministic truthful mecha-
nisms when the cost functions are submodular. Our lower bound assumes no restriction on the
mechanism side, but an expanded class of valuations. The Nisan-Ronen conjecture has been
shown to hold for only special classes of mechanisms (local [33], strongly monotone [32], and
anonymous [3] mechanisms).
The importance of the Nisan-Ronen conjecture is that it captures in a crisp way the dif-
ficulties that incentive compatibility adds to algorithm theory. It is a happy coincidence for
the development of algorithmic mechanism design that the optimization problem they chose
to study, the unrelated machines scheduling problem, turned out to be the most challenging
problem in the area. This work validates the motivating hypothesis of Nisan and Ronen that
incentive compatibility adds insurmountable difficulties for minmax optimization. In order to
establish our result, we develop new techniques, potentially with wider applicability: a partial
multiplayer characterization and lower bounds for linear mechanisms (Section 4.3).
Theorem 1. There is no deterministic truthful mechanism with approximation ratio better than√
n− 1 for the problem of scheduling n unrelated machines with submodular cost functions.
Actually we show a stronger result: Let M be the class of scheduling mechanisms which
are deterministic and truthful when all machines are additive except for one machine, which is
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submodular. Then no mechanism in M has an approximation ratio better than
√
n− 1 on the
set of instances of scheduling unrelated additive machines.
Other valuation classes.
Our results hold also for supermodular valuations. There is no difficulty in translating, in
fact carbon-copying the proof of our characterization theorem for this case. Interestingly, the
class of additive valuations of the original Nisan-Ronen conjecture is exactly the intersection of
submodular and supermodular valuations.
In fact, we provide a stronger version of Theorem 1 by considering submodular (or super-
modular or any superclass of these) functions which are also ε-additive, in the sense that the
execution time of a set of tasks is within an arbitrarily small ε from the sum of the execution
times of its tasks (see Section 2 for precise definitions, and the long version of our paper [9] for
details of the proofs).
1.2 Overview of the techniques
We provide an overview of our approach for the lower bound. We consider instances in which
every task has a fixed large value, practically infinite, for all except for two machines; one of
the two machines is always the submodular player and the other is an additive player. We can
assume that each task is allocated to one of its two machines with the non ‘infinite’ values,
otherwise the approximation ratio is sufficiently high. Such restrictions of the allocation to
only two players per task, have been previously used (e.g. [12, 24]). The main difference with
previous approaches is that we use properties of mechanisms that involve at least three players,
the submodular player and two other players. Obtaining such multiplayer statements is the
bottleneck for a complete characterization of mechanisms in multiplayer domains.
Two-player characterization.
We first focus on the tasks that can be allocated to a particular additive player and fix the
values of the remaining tasks. For each additive player, there are only two such tasks, and
the situation is very similar to the two-player and two-task special case in which the valuation
of one player is submodular. A core part of our proof, which may be of independent interest,
is a characterization of the allocation functions of all truthful mechanisms for this case. We
provide a complete characterization for the case of two players with non-negative, submodular
valuations, which, for one player, are bounded above by a constant. The latter is essential in
our construction to guarantee that the fixed large value of the other machines does not play any
role. Since this is a minimization problem, it is the lower bound (i.e., the restriction that the
values are non-negative) that creates complications rather than the upper bound on the domain.
We also provide a characterization for additive valuations, the actual scheduling domain.
We note that similar two-player characterizations have been provided by previous work
[19, 11], for auctions and scheduling domains, but none of these can be used in our approach.
In particular, the characterization of [19] for scheduling relies extensively on the bounded ap-
proximation for two players, but we need a characterization without this assumption. The
reason is that the approximation ratio of any two players is in general unrelated to the ap-
proximation ratio of the whole multi-player instance. In the same work, a characterization for
auctions with subadditive valuations is provided, but this is also of no use to the minimization
we consider here. Finally, the characterization of [11] cannot be used because it allows negative
values.
Indeed, as we show in Section 3, the scheduling domain admits truthful mechanisms not
present in the previous characterizations of [19, 11], which we call relaxed affine minimizers.
Such mechanisms are essentially affine minimizers for large values, but for small values they
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can have non-linear boundaries (see Definitions 4, 5 and Figure 2). We summarize here the
characterization result, see Theorem 3 for the precise statement and the full version [9] for a
proof.
Theorem 2 (Informal). Every truthful allocation for two tasks and two players where one player
is submodular, and the other additive and bounded from above, and both tasks are always allo-
cated, is one of these three types: (1) relaxed affine minimizer, (2) one-dimensional mechanism,
or (3) constant mechanism.
Gluing two-player mechanisms to multi-player linear mechanisms.
From the characterization of two-payer two-task mechanisms and using the fact that we are
interested in mechanisms with small approximation ratio for the whole multi-player instances,
we are able to exclude all mechanisms except of those that have affine boundaries (roughly:
critical values/payments linear in the other player’s cost for the task, see Definition 8 and
Lemma 3), that is, affine minimizers whose coefficients may depend on the values of the other
tasks.
One of the main technical steps is that we use the truthfulness of the submodular player
to show that the scaling coefficient of these linear boundary functions do not actually depend
on the values of the other tasks (Lemma 4). The rest of the proof, which includes the most
complicated technical steps of this work, is to analyze the properties of truthful linear allocation
algorithms that facilitate the proof of the lower bound (Lemma 6).
Organization of the paper.
After the preliminaries (Section 2), the types of mechanisms appearing in the characterization
(Theorem 3) are introduced and their truthfulness is shown in Section 3. Based on Theorem 3,
we prove the lower bound result in Section 4.
1.3 Related work
The problem of scheduling unrelated machines is a typical multi-dimensional mechanism design
problem. In multi-dimensional mechanism design, the valuation of each player for different
outcomes is expressed via a vector (one value for every outcome). In the case of unrelated
scheduling, this vector expresses the processing times of a machine for each subset of tasks and
can be succinctly represented by an m-valued vector, one value for each task.
An interesting special case, which is well-understood, is the single-dimensional mechanism
design in which the values of the vector are expressions of a single parameter. The principal
representative is the problem of scheduling related machines, where the cost of each machine can
be expressed via a single parameter, its speed. This was first studied by Archer and Tardos [2]
who showed that, in contrast to the unrelated machines version, an algorithm that minimizes
the makespan can be truthfully implemented — albeit in exponential time. It was subsequently
shown that truthfulness has essentially no impact on the computational complexity of the
problem. Specifically, a randomized truthful-in-expectation1 PTAS was given in [16] and a
deterministic PTAS was given in [13, 21]; a PTAS is the best possible algorithm even for the
pure algorithmic problem (unless P = NP ).
The main obstacle in resolving the Nisan-Ronen conjecture is the lack of clear algorithmic
understanding of truthfulness for many players in multi-dimensional domains. In contrast, we
understand better truthfulness for a single player. Saks and Yu [35] gave a nice, complete char-
acterization of deterministic truthful mechanisms for convex domains which was later extended
1This is one of the two main definitions of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms, where truth-telling
maximizes the expected utility of each player.
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to truthful-in-expectation randomized mechanisms in [1]. This characterization states that the
class of allocations of truthful mechanisms is the class of weakly monotone algorithms [5]. This
is an elegant characterization, but it has not been proved very useful for mechanisms of many
players, because it is difficult to combine monotonicity of each individual player into a single
global condition. Its direct applications have provided only constant lower bounds for makespan
minimization [12, 32, 24, 33]. What would be more useful is a characterization similar to the one
provided by the seminal work of Roberts [34] for unrestricted domains. It essentially states that
the only truthful mechanisms are affine extensions of VCG. Similar characterizations have been
provided in [11, 19, 18] for settings with only two players. Extending these characterizations to
multiple players for scheduling and combinatorial auctions is notoriously hard, mainly due to
lack of externalities in these settings: the valuation of a player for an allocation depends only
on the subset of tasks it receives and is indifferent on how the remaining tasks are assigned to
the other players2.
Scheduling is related to combinatorial auctions, where multiple items need to be assigned to
a set of buyers. This is a broad and successful area, and the setting shares both aforementioned
features of multi-dimensionality and lack of externalities, therefore insights and techniques can
be transferred from the one problem to the other. However the difference is that the objective
for combinatorial auctions is social welfare maximization, and this is known to be achieved by
the VCG mechanism, albeit in exponential time. Hence the focus on this rich area is on what
can be achieved by computationally efficient mechanisms (see for example [20]). But in the case
of the scheduling with the min-max objective, the flavor is more information theoretic, as we
know that not even exponential time truthful mechanisms can achieve the optimal makespan.
1.3.1 Further related work
Lavi and Swamy [25] proposed an interesting approach to attack the Nisan-Ronen question, by
restricting the input domain, but still keep the multi-dimensional flavour of the setting. They
assumed that each entry in the input matrix can take only two possible values “low” and “high”,
that are publicly known to the designer. In this case, they showed an elegant deterministic
mechanism with an approximation factor of 2. Surprisingly, even for this special case there is a
lower bound of 11/10. Yu [38] extended the results for a range of values, and Auletta et al. [4]
studied multi-dimensional domains where the private information of the machines is a single
bit.
Randomization has been explored and slightly improved the known guarantees. There are
two notions of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms. A mechanism is universally truthful
if it is defined as a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms, while it is
truthful-in-expectation, if in expectation no player can benefit by lying. In [33], a universally
truthful mechanism was proposed for the case of two machines, and was later extended to the
case of n machines by Mu’alem and Schapira [32] with an approximation guarantee of 0.875n,
which was later improved to 0.837n by [30]. Lu and Yu [31] showed a truthful-in-expectation
mechanism with an approximation guarantee of (m+ 5)/2. Mu’alem and Schapira [32], showed
a lower bound of 2 − 1/m, for both notions of randomization. Christodoulou, Koutsoupias
and Kovács [8] extended the lower bound for fractional mechanisms, where each task can be
fractionally allocated to multiple machines. They also showed a fractional mechanism with a
guarantee of (m + 1)/2. A sequence of papers studied randomized mechanisms for the special
case of two machines [29, 31] where a tight answer on the approximation factor is still unresolved.
Currently, the best upper bound is 1.587 due to Chen, Du, and Zuluaga [7].
Truthful implementations of other objectives have been explored by Mu’alem and Schapi-
ra [32] for multi-dimensional problems and by Epstein, Levin and van Stee [21] for single-
2For two players, there exist implicit externalities as the tasks one player doesn’t get determine what the other
player gets.
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dimensional ones, giving a PTAS for a wide range of objective functions. Leucci, Mamageishvili
and Penna [28] showed high lower bounds for other min-max objectives on some combinato-
rial optimization problems. In the Bayesian setting, Daskalakis and Weinberg [15] showed a
mechanism that is at most a factor of 2 from the optimal truthful mechanism, but not with
respect to optimal makespan. Chawla et al. [6] provided bounds of prior-independent mecha-
nisms (where the input comes from a probability unknown to the mechanism). Giannakopoulos
and Kyropoulou [22] showed that the VCG mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of
O(log n/ log log n) under some distributional and symmetry assumptions.
2 Preliminaries
There is a set N of n machines and a set M of m tasks that need to be scheduled on the
machines. The processing time or cost that each machine i takes to process a subset S of tasks
is described by a set function ti : 2
m → R≥0. In classic unrelated machines scheduling, and
in the Nisan-Ronen model, the cost functions (valuations) are additive and the objective is to
minimize the makespan (min-max objective). In our lower bound construction, we will assume
that all cost functions are additive except for one machine, for which we consider more general
normalized and monotone cost functions:3 We mainly focus on submodular cost functions, which
satisfy the following condition for every S, T ⊆M
ti(S ∪ T ) + ti(S ∩ T ) ≤ ti(S) + ti(T ).
In case of supermodular functions the inequality is reversed. We also consider valuations
which are arbitrarily close to additive, which we call ε-additive, such that for every subset
S,
∑
j∈S(ti({j}))− ε ≤ ti(S) ≤
∑
j∈S(ti({j})) + ε.4
We will assume that all cost functions are additive, except for one which is submodular, or
ε-additive, or both submodular and ε-additive. The results carry over to supermodular valua-
tions and classes of valuations that include these, like subadditive, superadditive or arbitrary
(normalized, monotone) valuations.
Mechanism design setting.
We assume that each machine i ∈ N is controlled by a selfish agent (player) that is reluctant to
process the tasks and the cost function ti is private information known only to her (also called
the type of agent i). In the most general version of the problem, the set Ti of possible types of
agent i consists of all vectors bi ∈ R2
m
+ . Let also T = ×i∈NTi be the space of type profiles.
A mechanism defines for each player i a set Bi of available strategies, the player can choose
from. We will consider direct revelation mechanisms, i.e., Bi = Ti for all i, meaning that the
players strategies are to simply report their types to the mechanism. A player may report a
false cost function bi 6= ti, if this serves her interests. A mechanism (A,P ) consists of two parts:
An allocation algorithm: The allocation algorithm A allocates the jobs to the machines
depending on the players’ bids b = (b1, . . . , bn). Let A be the set of all possible partitions
of m tasks to n machines. The allocation function A : T → A partitions the tasks into the
n machines; we denote by Ai(b) the subset of tasks assigned to machine i for bid profile b.
A payment scheme: The payment scheme P = (P1, . . . , Pn) determines the payments also
depending on the bid values b. The functions P1, . . . , Pn stand for the payments that the
mechanism hands to each agent i.e. Pi : T → R.
3A cost function is normalized if ti(∅) = 0, and monotone if ti(S) ≤ ti(T ) for S ⊆ T .
4We are free to use any reasonable definition of being close to additive, e.g., we could have chosen (1 −
ε)
∑
j∈S(ti({j})) ≤ ti(S) ≤ (1+ε)
∑
j∈S(ti({j})), or even the intersection of the latter with the current (additive)
ε-neighborhood.
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The utility ui of a player i is the payment that he gets minus the actual time that he needs
to process the set of tasks assigned to her, ui(b) = Pi(b)−ti(Ai(b)). We are interested in truthful
mechanisms. A mechanism is truthful, if for every player, reporting his true type is a dominant
strategy. Formally,
ui(ti, b−i) ≥ ui(t′i, b−i), ∀i ∈ [n], ti, t′i ∈ Ti, b−i ∈ T−i,
where T−i denotes the possible types of all players disregarding i.
We use as an objective to evaluate the performance of a mechanism’s allocation algorithm
the makespan, that is the maximum completion time over all machines. The makespan of the












We are interested in the approximation ratio of the mechanism’s allocation algorithm. A mech-
anism M is c-approximate, if the allocation algorithm is c-approximate, that is, if c ≥ Mech(t)Opt(t)
for all possible inputs t.
We are looking for truthful mechanisms with low approximation ratio irrespective of the
running time to compute A and P. In other words, our lower bounds do not make use of any
computational assumptions.
Weak monotonicity.
A useful characterization of truthful mechanisms in terms of the following monotonicity condi-
tion, helps us to get rid of the payments and focus on the properties of the allocation algorithm.
Definition 1. An allocation algorithm A is called weakly monotone (WMON) if it satisfies the
following property: for every two inputs t = (ti, t−i) and t
′ = (t′i, t−i), the associated allocations
A and A′ satisfy
ti(Ai)− ti(A′i) ≤ t′i(Ai)− t′i(A′i).
It is well known that the allocation function of every truthful mechanism is WMON [5], and
also that this is a sufficient condition for truthfulness in convex domains [35] (which is the case
for all domains of this work).
A useful tool in our proof relies on the following immediate consequence of WMON, which
holds in additive domains as well as in the other domains that we consider. Intuitively, it states
that when you fix the values of all players for a subset of tasks (focus on a cut of your domain),
then the restriction of the allocation to the rest of the tasks must remain weakly monotone.
Lemma 1. Let A be a WMON allocation. Let us fix an (S, T ) partition of M , and consider
only valuations ti of player i that are additive across S and T , i.e., for every X ⊆M , ti(X) =
ti(X ∩ S) + ti(X ∩ T ). Then the restriction of the allocation A on S is weakly monotone for
each valuation fixed on the subsets of T.
Proof. A is weakly monotone, therefore
ti(Ai)− t′i(Ai) ≤ ti(A′i)− t′i(A′i),
and additivity across S and T implies
ti(Ai ∩ S)− t′i(Ai ∩ S) ≤ ti(A′i ∩ S)− t′i(A′i ∩ S),




























Figure 1: The allocation A[s] to the t-player depending on his own bid vector (t1, t2) :
(a) quasi-bundling allocation; (b) quasi-flipping allocation; (c) crossing allocation. The interiors
of some regions might be empty, but R∅ 6= ∅ can be assumed w.l.o.g. We marked the functions
of critical values ψ(t2, s) (Definition 7) for receiving task 1 by broken lines.
The following lemma was essentially shown in [33] and has been a useful tool to show lower
bounds for truthful mechanisms for several variants (see for example [12, 32, 3]). Although this
holds more generally, we only state it (and use it in Section 4) for additive valuations.
Lemma 2. Let t be a bid vector of additive valuations, and let S = Ai(t) be the subset assigned to
player i by a truthful mechanism (A,P ). For any bid vector t′ = (t′i, t−i) such that only the bid of
machine i has changed and in such a way that for every task in S it has decreased (i.e., t′i({j}) <
ti({j}), j ∈ S) and for every other task it has increased (i.e., t′i({j}) > ti({j}), j ∈M \S). Then
the mechanism does not change the allocation to machine i, i.e., Ai(t
′) = Ai(t) = S.
The main challenge in multi-player settings is that the allocation of the other machines may
change and the above condition makes no promise about how this can happen.
3 Characterization for two players
A core element of our lower bound proof is a characterization of truthful mechanisms for two
tasks and two players (called t-player, and s-player). The details of the characterization proof
can be found in the full version of the paper [9]. There we first provide a characterization
for additive valuations t = (t1, t2), and s = (s1, s2), so that both s1 and s2 are bounded by
an arbitrarily large but fixed value B. Then we extend it when the t player has submodular
valuations t = (t1, t2, t12) (Theorem 3), which is the main element that we need in the lower
bound proof in Section 4. We note that both the characterization and the lower bound result
hold analogously when the t-player has arbitrary monotone, ε-additive (or submodular and
ε-additive), or supermodular valuations.
In this section we introduce the definitions that we will need in order to state the main result
and also introduce some notation which will be used in our lower bound proof in Section 4.
3.1 Basic Definitions
Let (A,P ) be a truthful mechanism, where A is the WMON allocation function, and P denotes
the payment function. For input (t, s) the allocation is A(t, s). Since we have only tasks 1 and
2, in A(t, s) we can denote the allocation to one of the players as αt, αs ∈ {12, 1, 2, ∅}.
For given s ∈ [0, B) × [0, B) the allocation for the t-player as function of his own bids
(t1, t2) (or (t1, t2, t12)) is denoted by A[s], and symmetrically A[t] is an allocation function for
the s-player. For αt ∈ {12, 1, 2, ∅}, the allocation regions Rαt(s) ⊆ R2≥0 (resp. R3≥0) of A[s] are
defined to be the interior (wrt. R2≥0) of the set of all t values such that A(t, s) = αt. For the
s-player we denote the respective regions by Rsαs(t).
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Additive players.
It is known that in the case of two tasks, the regions in a WMON allocation subdivide R2≥0
basically in three possible forms, which are characteristic for the type of the whole allocation-
function A (see Figure 1). In fact, it is an equivalent condition with WMON that A[t−i] has
this form of a geometric representation for every fixed i and t−i [11, 37]. The regions and their
boundaries determine the critical values for t1 (as functions of t2) above which the t-player
cannot get task 1, and symmetrically for task 2. These critical value functions are determined
by the payment functions P∅(s) = 0, P1(s), P2(s), P12(s) for fixed s. For example, the t-player
minimizes her total cost (negative utility) by truth-telling, so for all t ∈ R12 it must hold that
(say) t1 + t2−P12 ≤ t2−P2, which yields the vertical boundary position t1 = P12−P2 between
R12 and R2, etc. For every fixed s, the payments can w.l.o.g. be defined in such a way that
(0 =)P∅ ≤ P1 ≤ P12, and P∅ ≤ P2 ≤ P12. It can be shown that all the payments must be the
same in the submodular (ε-additive, etc.) domain, as restricted to the additive domain.
Definition 2. For given s, we call the allocation A[s]
• quasi-bundling, if there are at least two points t 6= t′ on the boundary of R12 and R∅
• quasi-flipping, if there are at least two points t 6= t′ on the boundary of R1 and R2
• crossing otherwise (see Figure 1).
3.2 Mechanisms for submodular players
We now introduce the types of WMON allocations that can occur when the t-player is sub-
modular and the s-player is additive with s1 and s2 bounded above by the value B. We denote
these particular domains Tt×Ts for two players and two tasks by Vsubmod × V+,B, and refer the
reader to the full version for detailed definitions, and also for extension of our results to other
domains. We assume that there always exist high enough t values so that the t-player receives
no task, i.e., that R∅(s) 6= ∅ for every s.5
3.2.1 1-dimensional mechanisms.
In a one-dimensional mechanism at most two possible allocations are ever realized. Due to the
assumption on R∅, one of these must be the allocation ∅ to the t-player. If the two occuring
allocations (for the t-player) are ∅ and 12, we call the mechanism bundling mechanism. The
other cases when the allocations to the t-player are ∅ and 1 (or ∅ and 2) are degenerate task-
independent allocations, and can be defined similarly to bundling mechanisms.
Definition 3. In a bundling mechanism only the allocations ∅ and 12 can occur. There is an
arbitrary, non-decreasing function ξ : [0, B)→ [0,∞) so that if t12 > ξ(s1+s2) then the t-player
gets ∅, and if t12 < ξ(s1 + s2) then the t-player gets 12.
If ξ has a jump discontinuity in some point s1 + s2 then the critical value may depend
on the concrete (s1, s2) with the given fixed sum, as long as it is between ξ((s1 + s2)
−) and
ξ((s1 +s2)
+) (symmetric statement holds for the s-player, if ξ is constant and therefore ξ−1 has
a jump discontinuity).
We remark that a bundling mechanism can be considered as a relaxed affine minimizer having
γ1 = γ2 = ∞ (see next paragraph). A bundling mechanism is truthful with the normalized
payments P∅(s) = P1(s) = P2(s) = 0, and P12(s) = ξ(s1 + s2) for the t-player, and analogously,
P s12(t) = ξ
−1(t12) for the s-player. For every fixed bid s, the t-player incurs total cost of either
5This assumption is without loss of generality for mechanisms with finite approximation of the makespan,
even if some 2D cut mechanism of a WMON mechanism with more tasks and/or players is considered.
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t12 − P12 = t12 − ξ(s1 + s2), or 0. Given that she bids t12 truthfully, her total cost will be
min{t12 − ξ(s1 + s2), 0}, because the allocation of the mechanism minimizes among these two
terms as well. The truthfulness for the s-player is analogous.
3.2.2 Relaxed affine minimizers.
Definition 4. An allocation A is an affine minimizer, if there exist positive constants per player
µt and µs, and constants γα ∈ R∪{−∞,∞} per allocation (say, here α = αt), so that for every
input (t, s) the allocation A(t, s) minimizes over
µtt12 + γ12, µtt1 + µss2 + γ1, µss1 + µtt2 + γ2, µs(s1 + s2) + γ∅.
Subtracting the last term, and dividing by µt yields that the payments of the t-player in
an affine minimizer can be P∅ = 0, P1 = max{(µss1 + γ∅ − γ1)/µt, 0}, P2 = max{(µss2 +
γ∅ − γ2)/µt, 0} and P12 = max{(µs(s1 + s2) + γ∅ − γ12)/µt, P1, P2}. Then the allocation of the
mechanism minimizes precisely the player’s total cost if she bids truthfully (and analogously for
the s-player).
Definition 5. An allocation A is a relaxed affine minimizer, if there exist positive constants
per player µt and µs, and constants γα per allocation α = αt, furthermore an arbitrary non-
decreasing function ξ : [0,min(γ1, γ2)− γ∅]→ [0,min(γ1, γ2)− γ12] (assuming both intervals are
nonempty) with ξ(min(γ1, γ2)− γ∅) = min(γ1, γ2)− γ12, so that for every input (t, s)
(a) if µs · (s1 + s2) ≥ min(γ1, γ2)−γ∅, then the allocation A(t, s) is that of an affine minimizer
with the given constants
(b) if µs · (s1 + s2) ≤ min(γ1, γ2)− γ∅, then if µt · t12 > ξ(µs(s1 + s2)) then the allocation for
the t-player is ∅ and if µt · t12 < ξ(µs · (s1 + s2)) then it is 12.
The payments of the t-player P∅(s), P1(s) and P2(s) are defined as for affine minimizers.
The payment P12(s) is the same as in affine minimizers if µs · (s1 + s2) ≥ min(γ1, γ2)− γ∅, but
it is P12 = ξ(µs(s1 + s2))/µt, if µs · (s1 + s2) ≤ min(γ1, γ2)− γ∅. Observe that in the latter case
P1 = P2 = 0 must hold, and therefore the regions R1 and R2 are empty.
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The conditions in the above definition in cases (a) and (b) are consistent. The resulting
mechanism is truthful, by the same argument we used above for bundling mechanisms and for
affine minimizers. It is crucial that the t-player cannot influence whether case (a) or (b) holds.
On the other hand, we could have defined the mechanism symmetrically, from the point of view
of the s-player, so for her the mechanism is truthful as well.7 See Figure 2, for an example of
such a mechanism in the additive domain.
3.2.3 Constant mechanisms.
In a constant mechanism the allocation is independent of the bids of at least one of the players.
This property can also be interpreted as being an affine minimizer with a multiplicative constant
µ = 0. Due to the assumption on R∅ we only need to consider constant mechanisms that are
independent (at least) of the s-player.
6In turn, if µs · x > min(γ1, γ2) − γ∅, then there exist s, so that x = s1 + s2 but R1 6= ∅ or R2 6= ∅, and this
excludes a nonlinear ξ.
7The allocation is well-defined even if (say) µs · (s1 + s2) ≤ min(γ1, γ2)− γ∅, but µt · (t12) > min(γ1, γ2)− γ12.
Namely, for the t-player the allocation seems bundling, but t12 is large and he gets no task; for the s-player the











Figure 2: An example of a relaxed affine minimizer, which shows the allocation of the t-player.
The solid lines show the boundaries of the allocations for values of the s-player when s1+s2 ≥ 1.
The dashed lines show the allocation boundary when s1 + s2 < 1. Sometimes we refer to this
part of relaxed affine minimizers as “bundling tail”.
3.3 The main characterization result
The characterization that we use for the lower bound is captured by the following theorem,
whose proof can be found in the full version of the paper [9].
Theorem 3. Every WMON allocation for two tasks and two players with bids t ∈ Vsubmod
and s ∈ V+,B, where both tasks are always allocated, and R∅(s) 6= ∅ for every s, is one of
these three types: (1) relaxed affine minimizer, (2) one-dimensional mechanism, or (3) constant
mechanism.
In the full version we show that the same characterization (and hence our lower bound) holds
for WMON allocations for various domains of valuations of the t-player and in particular for
submodular valuations which are arbitrarily close to additive, which we denote by Vε ∩Vsubmod .
4 Lower Bound
In this section, we give a proof of our main theorem (Theorem 1). First in Section 4.1 we
describe the domain of instances that we use, and in Section 4.2 we use the characterization for
two machines and two tasks (Theorem 3) to establish that the only interesting mechanisms are
linear (see the subsection for a precise definition), then in Section 4.3 we explore the linearity
property of mechanisms with bounded approximation ratio to establish some useful locality
lemmas that are eventually used in Section 4.4 to complete the proof.
4.1 The construction
To prove the lower bound, we focus on the domain of 2(n − 1) tasks and n players. Player 0
is special and for convenience we use the symbol t for its values; sometimes we refer to it as
the t-player. We use the symbol s for the values of the remaining players 1, . . . , n − 1, and
sometimes we refer to them as the s-players.
The set of tasks M = {1, 1′, 2, 2′, . . . , n − 1, (n − 1)′} is partitioned in pairs and each pair
{i, i′} is associated with player i, i = 1, . . . , n− 1. We call the two tasks of each pair {i, i′} twin
tasks.
Let vi(S) denote the cost (valuation) of player i when it takes the subset S ⊆M of tasks.
• the cost of the s-players is additive: vi(S) is additive for i ≥ 1.
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• the cost of the s-players for tasks not in their associated pair is a sufficiently large fixed
constant Θ 4n2: for distinct i, j ≥ 1, vi({j}) = vi({j′}) = Θ.
• the cost of the t-player for twin tasks is submodular: for every i = 1, . . . , n − 1, the
restriction of v0(S) to S ⊆ {i, i′} is submodular.
• the cost of the t-player is additive across pairs: v0(S) =
∑n−1
i=1 v0(S ∩ {i, i′}). Therefore
v0(S) is submodular, as the sum of submodular functions.
To simplify the notation we will denote an instance that satisfies the above conditions by




• si and si′ are the costs of the i-th s-player for the tasks in its associated pair {i, i′},
• ti or ti′ , resp., is the cost of the t-player when it takes only one of the twin tasks {i, i′},
• ti,i′ is the cost of the t-player when it takes both twin tasks {i, i′}.
With the exception of costs ti,i′ an instance is captured by the following matrix indexed by
players and tasks, which shows the cost of each when a player gets no other task.
t1 t1′ t2 t2′ · · · tn−1 t(n−1)′
s1 s1′ Θ Θ · · · Θ Θ
Θ Θ s2 s2′ · · · Θ Θ
...
Θ Θ Θ Θ · · · sn−1 s(n−1)′
 .
If the valuations of all players were additive, this matrix would be sufficient to determine the
cost for all bundles. The instances we consider have more general cost functions and include
the submodular valuation of twin tasks for the t-player. Since for two tasks, a function is
submodular if and only if it is subadditive, values ti,i′ satisfy
ti,i′ ≤ ti + ti′ .
It is useful to think of the value Θ as practically infinite, since it is much larger than the
other values. On the other hand, to prove our main theorem in its generality, we need this value
to be finite and this complicates the characterization of truthful mechanisms.
We focus on instances that satisfy si ∈ [0, 1], si′ = n, ti′ = 0, ti,i′ = ti + ti′ for all i ∈ [n− 1].
Note the subtlety here: while the domain contains instances with ti,i′ ≤ ti + ti′ , for the proof of
the lower bound, we consider the subclass of additive instances. This should not be surprising
in the sense that lower bound proofs usually employ a subclass of instances. Still, it raises the
question whether we could carry out the same proof in the additive domain. The answer is
negative, because the sets of mechanisms for additive and submodular (subadditive) domains
for two tasks are different; for example, task-independent mechanisms are not truthful for
submodular domains.
Definition 6 (Restricted (t, s) instance). Instances of the form (ti, si, ti′ , si′ , ti,i′)
n−1
i=1 (Equa-
tion 1) that satisfy
si ∈ [0, 1], si′ = n, ti′ = 0, ti,i′ = ti + ti′ , for all i ∈ [n− 1], (2)





will be called restricted (t, s) instances.
Note that, unlike the other values, the ti values can be arbitrarily high. This will be useful
later (Lemma 3). Note also that the optimum makespan of every restricted instance is at most
1. For these instances, any algorithm with approximation ratio less than n, must allocate all
the i′ tasks to the t-player and every i task either to the associated si-player or to the t-player.
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4.2 From affine minimizers for twin tasks to linear mechanisms
In this section, we use the characterization of mechanisms (Theorem 3) for each pair of twin
tasks in an instance (ti, si, ti′ , si′ , ti,i′)
n−1
i=1 , to derive an essential property of mechanisms for the
restricted (t, s) instances. By the characterization, there are mechanisms for twin tasks, such
as the one-dimensional, constant, or bundling tails of relaxed affine minimizers, that may have
non-affine boundaries between different allocations. In this section, we show that mechanisms
with non-affine boundaries are also excluded, when we additionally require that the mechanisms
have small approximation ratio – on whole instances, not just on a pair of twin tasks.
First we define the notion of boundaries that we consider in the proof of the lower bound.
Definition 7. For a given allocation algorithm, considered on restricted (t, s) instances, we call
ψi(si, s−i, t−i) a critical value or boundary if the t-player receives task i when ti < ψi(si, s−i, t−i),
and does not receive task i when ti > ψi(si, s−i, t−i) (for example in Figure 1, ψ1 is shown with
dashed lines).
We claim below that a truthful allocation with a reasonable approximation ratio (say, of at
most n) for the restricted (t, s) instances satisfies the following important property:
Definition 8 (Linear mechanisms). An allocation algorithm for the restricted (t, s) instances
(Equation 2), is called linear if the critical values for task i, i = 1, . . . , n−1 are truncated affine
functions in si. In particular when
ψi(si, s−i, t−i) = max(0, λi(s−i, t−i) si + νi(s−i, t−i)),
for some λi(s−i, t−i) > 0. We call a mechanism linear, if it uses a linear allocation algorithm.
Lemma 3. A mechanism for the instances (ti, si, ti′ , si′ , ti,i′)
n−1
i=1 (Equation 1) with approxi-
mation ratio less than n must be linear for the restricted (t, s) instances.
Proof. By Lemma 1, the restriction of the mechanism for the twin tasks i, i′ is weakly mono-
tone, and therefore by the characterization theorem (Theorem 3), it is either a relaxed affine
minimizer, a one-dimensional, or a constant mechanism. We will show that if the approximation
ratio is less than n, the mechanism cannot be one-dimensional, constant, or the bundling part
of a relaxed affine minimizer. The reason is that algorithms in all these cases are so inefficient
that their makespan only for these two tasks is large enough to show a large approximation
ratio for the entire instance.
Let’s first argue that it cannot be a one-dimensional or a constant mechanism. We fix all
values of the other tasks as in restricted instances. There are (not restricted) values for the
twin tasks i, i′ for which the algorithm has makespan µ ≥ 2n and approximation ratio at least
2n. (For each one-dimensional or constant allocation this holds for at least one of the inputs





.) Since the optimal makespan of the other tasks of a restricted instance is at
most 1, the approximation ratio is at least µ/(1 + µ/2n) ≥ 2nµ/2µ = n.
As a result, the restriction to twin tasks i, i′ is a relaxed affine minimizer. We now argue
that if the instance is restricted, and in particular si ≤ 1 and si′ = n hold, then the t-player
should not be in the bundling part of the relaxed affine minimizer when the approximation ratio
is less than n (his allocation figure is as the solid lines in Figure 2, because si+ si′ is large). Let
us fix the values sj ∈ [0, 1], sj′ = n for all j ∈ [n−1], and the values t′j = 0, tj,j′ = tj + tj′ for all
j 6= i. We observe that the restriction of the mechanism in the cut t−{i,i′} (the 2-dimensional
partition when we also fix all other values except ti and t
′
i) should definitely contain an area
where the t-player gets task i′ but not i (in particular, when ti′ = δ, for some arbitrarily small
δ, and ti is very large). Otherwise the mechanism has approximation ratio at least n.
This shows that in the domain of restricted (t, s) instances, the mechanisms with approx-
imation ratio less than n are affine minimizers (for the t-player) in every cut of pairs of twin
tasks (even if in general, that is, for si′ < n they are relaxed affine minimizers). So, the only
mechanisms with approximation ratio less than n are linear for the restricted (s, t) instances.
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4.3 Linearity
From now on we focus on linear truthful mechanisms for restricted (t, s) instances. Establishing
linearity of the boundaries (Lemma 3) is not directly useful, because the linear coefficient of
the boundary i may depend on the other values of t. The next lemma shows that this is not
the case for the scaling factor λi, although the νi term may still depend on the other values of
t. Its proof is based on the interaction of pairs of tasks i and j. Note that these are not twin
tasks but involve at least three players, the t-player and the two associated s-players. Obtaining
such multiplayer statements is the bottleneck for a complete characterization of mechanisms in
multiplayer domains, and it is perhaps the most crucial part of the proof.
Lemma 4. For fixed i and j, and for fixed s−i, t−ij, assume that ψi(si, s−i, t−i) is a trun-
cated linear function of si, i.e., ψi(si, s−i, t−i) = max(0, λi(s−i, t−i)si + νi(s−i, t−i)), for some
λi(s−i, t−i) ≥ 0. Then λi(s−i, t−i) is the same for all tj that satisfy ψi(si, s−i, t−i) > 0 (for
some si).
Proof. To keep the notation simple, we drop all values except for si and tj . Let K(si) = {tj :
ψi(si, tj) > 0} be the interval of interest. Note first that when we increase si, the interval of
interest can only expand, because ψi(si, tj) is non-decreasing in si.
Within interval K(si), function ψi(si, tj) is positive and therefore equal to λi(tj)si + νi(tj).
Furthermore, weak monotonicity implies that as a function of tj , ψi(si, tj) is a piecewise linear
function with derivative (slope) in {0, 1,−1} (see for example, Figure 1).
The piecewise linear function ψi(si, tj) is differentiable
8 everywhere except perhaps of the










If ∂λi(tj)/∂tj 6= 0, then by varying si, the slope cannot stay in {0, 1,−1}. We conclude that
∂λi(tj)/∂tj = 0 in each piece, which shows that λi(tj) is independent of tj within each piece
and therefore independent of tj everywhere.
The following corollary is an essential tool for establishing the lower bound.
Corollary 1. If the allocation restricted to tasks i, j is quasi-bundling or quasi-flipping, then the
constant parts of the piecewise linear function ψi(si, s−i, t−i), as a function of tj, are independent
of sj, for j 6= i.
Proof. We fix all values except for tasks i and j. By the previous lemma, when we change sj , the
boundary ψj(sj , si, ti) is translated rectilinearly and therefore its break points remain the same.
Since the constant parts of ψi(si, sj , tj) are determined by the break points of ψj(sj , si, ti), they
also remain the same. See Figure 3 for an illustration.
Corollary 2. If the allocation restricted to tasks i, j is quasi-bundling, then the piecewise linear
function ψi(si, s−i, t−i) is either non-decreasing in tj or non-decreasing in sj.
Proof. When we fix all other values and consider the t−{i,j} cut, it is either quasi-flipping or
crossing, in which case ψi(si, sj , tj) is non-decreasing in tj , or quasi-bundling, in which case
2D geometry shows that it is non-decreasing in sj (when sj decreases the diagonal part shifts
downwards, and the rectilinear parts remain fixed). See Figure 3 for an illustration.
8It is not hard to see that if ψi(si, tj) is differentiable then so are λi(tj) and νi(tj); alternatively, one could







Figure 3: Consider the dashed lines that show ψi(tj , sj) and ψj(ti, sj) (these functions may
depend on other values but they play no role and we can ignore them). The regular lines show
ψi(tj , ŝj) and ψj(ti, ŝj), for some ŝj > sj . Notice that linearity implies that ψj(ti, ŝj) is a shift to
the right of ψj(ti, sj); in particular, the break points stay at the same height. As a consequence,
the blue horizontal parts remain at the same height and the blue diagonal part shifts to the
right. Therefore ψi(tj , ŝj) ≥ ψi(tj , sj).
4.4 The main theorem
We now have most of the ingredients to prove the next theorem which directly implies the main
lower bound (Theorem 1).9
Theorem 4. The approximation ratio of linear truthful algorithms on restricted (t, s) instances
(Equation 2) with n machines is at least
√
n− 1.
To prove this theorem, we fix some linear truthful algorithm and we focus on a particular
set of instances, which we call s-inefficient. The set of s-inefficient instances depends on the
linear algorithm and each instance consists of two types of tasks: either a task is unimportant
(i.e., it has very small value for one of the machines), or its s value is significantly higher than
its t value, yet the algorithm allocates the task to the s-player.
Definition 9 (s-inefficient instances). Let’s call a task i trivial when either si = 0 or ti ∈
(0, δ0], for some fixed (sufficiently small) δ0. We call a restricted (t, s) instance s-inefficient
for a mechanism, if it contains at least one non-trivial task, every non-trivial task i satisfies
si/ti >
√
n− 1, and the mechanism allocates all non-trivial tasks to the s-player.
The heart of the proof is to show that if the set of s-inefficient instances is non-empty, there
exists an s-inefficient instance with exactly one non-trivial task. From this, it immediately
follows that if s-inefficient instances exist, then the algorithm has approximation ratio at least√
n− 1.
However, it may be that for a given linear truthful algorithm there are no s-inefficient
instances. But then we can use weak monotonicity to easily derive a
√
n− 1 lower bound on
the approximation ratio as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 5. If for a given truthful algorithm the set of s-inefficient instances is empty, then its
approximation ratio is at least
√
n− 1.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, consider an algorithm that has approximation ratio
√
n− 1−δ,
for some δ > 0, for which the set of s-inefficient instances is empty. We consider the instance
9We should emphasize that Lemma 4 and Theorem 4 hold independent of the domain of the t-player (whether






Figure 4: When the cut is quasi-flipping or crossing, and neither task is given to the t-player in
the allocation for (t1, t2) (w.l.o.g. (t1, t2) is not on the boundary), then the second task is still
not allocated to the t-player in the allocation for (t∗1 ≈ 0, t2).
with ti = α = 1/
√
n− 1− δ/n and si = 1, for all i ∈ [n− 1].






Note that at least one task is allocated to the s-players, because if all tasks are assigned to the
t-player, the makespan is (n−1)α =
√
n− 1− (n−1)δ/n >
√
n− 1−δ, the optimum makespan
is 1, and the approximation ratio is strictly greater than
√
n− 1− δ.
Now for every task i which is allocated to the t-player, we lower its value from α to some
small value in (0, δ0] and increase the t value of every other task to α+ δ/(2n) < 1/
√
n− 1. By
weak monotonicity (Lemma 2), the allocation of the tasks for the t-player remains the same.
Since at least one task is allocated to the s-players, we end up with an s-inefficient instance, a
contradiction.
The proof of the next lemma (Lemma 6), which provides a very useful property of linear
mechanisms, is the most critical part of the proof. It shows that linear weakly monotone
algorithms satisfy a locality property, that bears some resemblance to the locality property
in [33]. But unlike [33], our proof does not assume this property, but it derives it from weak
monotonicity for the special class of instances that we consider.
Lemma 6. If for a given linear truthful algorithm the set of s-inefficient instances is non-empty,
then there is an s-inefficient instance with exactly one non-trivial task.
Proof. Fix a linear truthful algorithm and consider an s-inefficient instance (t, s) with the mini-
mum number of non-trivial tasks. If the number of non-trivial tasks is at least two, let us assume
without loss of generality that tasks 1 and 2 are non-trivial. We will derive a contradiction by
reducing the number of non-trivial tasks.
Consider the boundary function of the first task, ψ1(s1, s−1, t−1) = max(0, λ1(s−1, t−1)s1 +
ν1(s−1, t−1), for some positive λ1. The crux of the matter is that we can reduce either the value
of s1 to 0, or t1 to at most δ0, and guarantee that the t-player will keep not getting the second
task. This guarantees that the second task is non-trivial and is given to the s-player, while the
first task becomes trivial.
If ψ2(s2, s−2, t−2) as a function of t1 is non-decreasing (i.e., the t−{1,2} cut is quasi-flipping
or crossing), we set t∗1 ∈ (0, δ0]. Since ψ2(s2, s−2, t−2) is non-decreasing in t1, in the new instance




















Figure 5: Left side case (a), when s∗1 decreases to 0: the boundary ψ2(t1, s
∗
1) is lower than the
boundary ψ2(t1, s
∗
1). Both tasks are still allocated to the s-player. Right side case (b), when
the si decreases to s
∗
1 = −ν1(s−1, t−1)/λ1(s−1, t−1) and t1 changes to t∗1 ≈ 0. The new (t∗1, t2)
remains in the region in which both tasks are allocated to the s-player.
Otherwise (i.e., the t−{1,2} cut is quasi-bundling), by Corollary 2, function ψ2(s2, s−2, t−2)
is non-decreasing in s1. In this case, we change the instance as follows (see Figure 5 for an
illustration of the first two cases):
a) if ν1(s−1, t−1) ≥ 0, we set s∗1 = 0 and t∗1 = t1,
b) otherwise, if ψ1(s1, s−1, t−1) > 0, we set
s∗1 = −ν1(s−1, t−1)/λ1(s−1, t−1)
and t∗1 ∈ (0, δ0], small enough to make task 1 trivial,
c) and if ψ1(s1, s−1, t−1) = 0, we set s
∗
1 = s1 and t
∗
1 ∈ (0, δ0], small enough to make task 1
trivial.
In the first two cases, we lower the s1 value to s
∗
1 until either s
∗
1 becomes 0 (case a), or
ψ1(s
∗
1, s−1, t−1) becomes 0 and then we set t1 = t
∗
1 ≈ 0 (case b). The third case is when
ψ1(s1, s−1, t−1) is already 0.
In all cases, the first task becomes a trivial task with the new values. Furthermore, in
all cases the new value of s1 is not greater than the original value: s
∗
1 ≤ s1. This is clearly
true in the first and third case. To see that this is true in the second case, observe that the
boundary ψ1(s1, s−1, t−1), which is a non-decreasing function on s1, moved from a positive value
to ψ1(s
∗
1, s−1, t−1) = 0.
We now argue that the second task is still given to the s-player after the change. The
argument is based on Corollary 1, which guarantees that the changes can only shift the boundary
ψ2(s2, s−2, t−2) rectilinearly: in Figure 5, the slanted part moves only horizontally.
For case (a), by Corollary 2, the boundary ψ2(s2, s−2, t−2) did not increase and therefore
the second task is still given to the s-player (left part of Figure 5). For the other two cases,
this is not sufficient because t1 changed and therefore t−2 changed as well. For case (b), the
change shifts the slanted boundary (right part of Figure 5). In its new position, the slanted
boundary meets the boundary of the positive orthant at (0, t2) which is dominated by the point
(t∗1, t2). Therefore, the t-player gets neither task, so the s-player gets the second task. Case (c)
is simpler and similar to the second one; the difference is that the slanted boundary starts at
the leftmost position and it does not need to move at all (see the dotted lines in the right part
of Figure 5).
The change of values of the first task did not change the allocation of the second task, but
it may have changed the allocation of the remaining non-trivial tasks. But we can use weak
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monotonicity to further change the instance to obtain an s-inefficient instance. If some non-
trivial tasks changed allocation and were given to the t player, we reduce their t values to 0 (this
will make them trivial), and increase slightly the t values of the other non-trivial tasks without
violating the constraint si/ti >
√
n− 1. By weak monotonicity (Lemma 2), this preserves the
allocation of the first player for the other non-trivial tasks. The resulting instance is s-inefficient
and has fewer non-trivial tasks, a contradiction.
The proof of the main result of this section follows directly from the last two lemmas.
Proof of Theorem 4. By the last two lemmas, either a linear truthful algorithm has approxi-
mation ratio at least
√
n− 1, or there exists an s-inefficient instance with one non-trivial task.
The approximation ratio of such an instance is trivially at least
√
n− 1, and the proof is com-
plete.
5 Conclusions
We showed a lower bound of Ω(
√
n) for the approximation ratio achieved by deterministic
truthful mechanisms for the problem of scheduling n unrelated machines with submodular cost
functions, when the objective is makespan minimization.
It remains open whether the lower bound can be improved to n, which we conjecture to be
the right answer, as in the Nisan-Ronen conjecture. However, we should note that the instances
used in our lower bound construction (Form (1) in Section 4.1) have approximation ratio Θ(
√
n).
This is so, because the weighted VCG mechanism that assigns a weight of
√
n to the t-player
and 1 to the rest of the players can achieve approximation ratio O(
√
n).
It should be emphasized that submodularity is essential to establish linearity, and hence to
achieve the claimed lower bound. An obstacle in extending our results to the case of additive
players is the existence of other, non-linear, mechanisms. In fact, in a follow up paper [10], we
show a new mechanism that achieves a constant approximation for the corresponding additive
instances of the lower bound construction.
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